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Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize. 
The nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political 
considerations with a specific political culture. The main objective of this study is to analyze 
the effect of political culture and of valuation asymmetry on discrimination between the 
contestants. The weights assigned to the public well being and the contestants' efforts 
represent the political culture while discrimination is an endogenous variable that 
characterizes the mechanism allocating the prize. We consider situations under which the 
optimal bias of the designer is in favor of the contestant with the larger or smaller prize 
valuation and examine the effect of changes in the political culture and in valuation 
asymmetry on the designer's preferred discrimination between the contestants. Focusing on 
the two most widely studied types of contest success functions (deterministic all-pay-auctions 
and logit CSFs), we show that an all-pay auction is always the preferred CSF from the point 
of view of the contest designer. This result provides a new political-economic micro 
foundation to some of the most commonly used models in the contest literature. 
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1. Introduction 
Endogenous determination of contests may relate to all relevant elements of contests. 
This is obviously true with respect to the actions taken by the contestants.
2 There are 
institutional elements, however, that are typically determined by contest designers; 
economic and political entrepreneurs. Such characteristics include the contest prize,  
the set of contestants, the structure of multi-stage contests, caps on political lobbying 
and the contest success function.
3  
  Most of the literature on optimal contest design has focused on the choice of 
contest characteristics assuming that the designer's objective function depends on the 
contestants' efforts. Few attempts have been made to study the relationship between 
the designed contest and more general objective functions that take into account not 
only the efforts incurred by the contestants.
4 Examining the endogenous 
determination of public policy that determines, in turn, the contestants' prizes or 
stakes, Epstein and Nitzan (2002), (2006a), (2006b), (2007), allow the designer's 
objective function to depend on the efforts of the contestants and on their expected 
aggregate utility. The weights assigned to these variables represent the political 
culture of the contest designers. 
  The current paper departs from the literature in three ways. First, it adds 
discrimination to the contest designer's tool box containing the possible means 
(control variables) to enhance his interest. Second, it applies the more general 
objective function proposed in Epstein and Nitzan (2002), (2006a), (2006b) to study 
the relationship between discrimination and political culture. Third, it compares the 
two most widely studied types of contest success functions (all-pay-auctions and logit 
                                                  
2 Notably these actions include their efforts, Congleton, Hillman and Konrad (2008), Konrad (2009) 
and to their decisions to enter the contest, Morgan, Orzen and Sefton (2008). Other contest 
characteristics determined by the contestants are the contest coalition formation, Bloch et al. (2006), 
Sanchez-Pages (2007), and, within collective or group contests, the sharing rules of the prize among 
the group members, in case the prize is won, Baik (2008), Baik and Lee (2001), Nitzan and Ueda 
(2009), Ueda (2002).  
3 Glazer and Hassin (1988), Moldovanu and Sela (2001) and Nti (2004) deal with the contest prize, 
Baye et al. (1993), Amegashie (2000) and Taylor (1995) focus on the set of contestants, Gradstein 
(1998), Gradstein and Konrad (1999) and Amegashie (2000) examine the structure of multi-stage 
contests, Che and Gale (1998) study caps on lobbying and Nti (1997), (2004) and Kahana and Nitzan 
(2002) are concerned with the contest success function. 
4 Studying the endogenous determination of the optimal prize, Runkel (2006) and Singh and Wittman 
(1998) consider a designer's payoff function that depends on the performance of the contestants and on 
the difference in their winning probabilities (the closeness of the contest). This difference represents 
the uncertainty of the contest outcome that affects the interest it arouses and, in turn, the size of the 
contest audience. Dasgupta and Nti (1998) consider the endogenous determination of the contest 
success function, assuming that the designer's objective function depends on aggregate efforts and on 
his own valuation of the prize that may induce him not to award the prize.   2
CSFs) under optimal discrimination. Such comparison has previously been carried out 
assuming either no discrimination, Che and Gale (1997), or some given, not 
necessarily optimal, discrimination, Epstein and Nitzan (2006b). Our main objective 
then is to analyze the effect of political culture and of asymmetry in the contestants' 
valuations of the prize on discrimination among the contestants and on the 
comparison between all-pay-auctions and logit CSFs.  
  Discrimination is often controlled by contest designers and our initial task is to 
clarify why this is indeed the case in the complex institutional environments where 
real contests are held. We also wish to justify our focus on the two most widely 
studied types of contest success functions. Our explanations of the empirical 
relevance of the particular design problem on which we focus are based on the 
economic and legal characteristics of the contest environment. 
  Many job openings and outsourcing of projects in the public sector need to be 
announced publicly in order to enable any interested potentially deserving candidate 
to take part in the contest on the position or project. By law, everyone is entitled to 
fair opportunity to take part and win the contest. However, each job or project has its 
specific required necessary conditions. These conditions are part of the contest 
requirements. The fact that the bureaucrat/regulator is responsible to determine and 
announce these requirements implies that he can control not only the group of 
contestants but, as in our abstract setting, give some candidate some known advantage 
over others. This is the basic reason why the bureaucrat is conceived as the contest 
designer. The designer can inform the contestants about the bias by stating, before the 
contest is held, the features that make a contestant advantageous (more likely to win). 
For example, the designer may state that he prefers the winner to have a strong 
financial background or sufficient administrative experience. Such open statement 
enables the designer to let the contestants know the bias in favor of one of them. 
However, this does not mean that the favored contestant certainly wins. It just means 
that the designer favors one contestant who is more likely to win if making the same 
effort as his rival. The bias is represented by the different values of a unit of effort 
made by the contestants. In the case of a conglomerate competing for a project, the 
designer may increase the winning chances of a different small group by adding 
specific requirements that give it an advantage over the conglomerate. He may 
declare, for instance, that firms with green technology experience have an advantage 
in the contest. In such a case, if the conglomerate does not have the required   3
experience while the small firm does, the designer makes the contest less naturally 
biased in favor of the conglomerate (due to its size). By doing so, the designer can 
make the contest more equal (competitive) in order to increase the outlays of the 
contestants.  
  The legal right to conduct the contest and discriminate among the contestants 
by ensuring that the contest requirements are fulfilled affects the contest outcome and 
gives the contest designer a lot of power. This power can be used to promote the 
intended goal of the law (enhancement of the public welfare) or the designer's narrow 
objectives (maximization of the contestants' efforts, sewing a job for a specific 
candidate). The empirical relevance of the problem of possible abuse of the designer's 
power is clear. Recent evidence from Israel can serve as an illustration. The 2007 
Israeli State Comptroller's Report refers to contests designed or tailor-made for 
specific candidates, as well as to conflicts of interest or biased tenders in many 
projects administered by the Haifa Port. More recently, in light of the potential 
misconduct of a designer who can manipulate the required conditions to fit his own 
objectives, the Israeli Civil Service Commissioner's report from January 2010 warned 
that his office cannot supervise all of the (over one hundred) openings for which 
auctions were announced. Thus, some of the contests are biased in order to achieve a 
goal which is not the maximization of the likelihood that the opening is filled with the 
best candidate. In our study, such alternative goal is represented by the assignments of 
weight to the contestants' efforts. 
Note that, usually, discrimination is considered as one of the characteristics of 
the prevailing political culture or of the government's ideology. In contrast, in our 
contest setting, the weights assigned to the public well being and the contestants' 
efforts represent the political culture while discrimination is an endogenous variable 
that characterizes the mechanism allocating the prize which hinges on the political 
culture. Put differently, discrimination does not represent the contest designer's 
preferences or an imposed constraint of the political-economic environment, but 
rather the means he deliberately and selfishly applies to enhance his interest. 
On the one hand, the law allows control on the degree of discrimination 
among the contestants. On the other hand, however, it protects the contestants by 
ensuring that their participation is minimally effective; they have some chance of 
"meaningful" winning if a contest is held. For this reason we restrict attention to 
competitive contest success functions. In particular, a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the   4
contestant who values the prize more highly is not allowed because it eliminates 
competition and "meaningful" winning. While the ability to bias by announcing the 
required conditions for participation in the contest is consistent with the reality of the 
contest environment, the ability to choose superior yet extreme mechanisms that 
eliminate competition and meaningful winning are inconsistent with the basic 
existence of competition and real economic incentives that give rise to a contest that is 
beneficial for one or both of the contestants.
5 The two families of contest success 
functions on which we focus do conform to the reality of contests as well as to the 
legal constraint that contests are meaningful. They can also be justified either 
axiomatically, in the case of Tullock lottery functions, see Clark and Riis (1998),
6 or 
on the grounds of common use in practice. In any event these families are the most 
widely studied types of contest success functions in the literature. 
  The results can also be tested empirically. In particular, one can 
empirically estimate the nature and extent of discrimination and the stakes of the 
contestants, and thus apply our results to expose the political culture inspiring these 
estimates. Consider the example of monopoly power assuming that in a series of 
contests the government decides who will be its single supplier of a certain “product”. 
In each period the contest designer publishes the terms of the contest and any firm 
that satisfies the necessary requirements can apply. Various parameters of this 
contest's environment can change over time: the contestants' stakes may change due to 
changes in the law that gives the winner more or less power and the contest designer, 
and, in turn, the political culture may change because of a change in the ruling 
political party. If the contest designer has not changed, then changes in the terms of 
the auction imply that discrimination changes due to a change in the contestants' 
stakes. We could thus relate changes in the stakes to changes in discrimination or the 
contest terms. On the other hand, comparing different contests with similar stakes 
over different periods with different contest designers enables the use of the available 
panel data, using dummy variables to identify the different designers and time fixed 
effects, in order to relate changes in the terms of the contests to changes in political 
culture that reflect the different contest designers. Of course many other variables 
                                                  
5 In contrast to the situation where the designer proposes a 'take it or leave it' offer to the individual 
with the higher prize valuation, in our case, when there is no contest, the winner and not the designer 
enjoys the prize. If the designer prefers the existence of a contest, he cannot choose a mechanism that 
precludes the direct or indirect abolition of competition by exclusion of contestants.  
6 We use the same type of discrimination as in Clark and Riis (1998). 
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would be taken into account, such as the economic state, the length of time the 
designer is in power, etc. To sum up, such analysis can be carried using panel data for 
different contests over different periods of time when both the stakes and the contest 
designers have changed. This analysis can be useful in examining how changes in 
contest designers and changes in the contestants' stakes affect discrimination.  
  Our first two results specify, in a two-contestant setting, the optimal 
discrimination from the point of view of the contest designer corresponding to any 
given combination of political culture and asymmetry between the contestants' 
valuation of the prize. These results enable the derivation of the conditions that 
determine whether the optimal bias is in favor of the contestant with the larger or 
smaller prize valuation and the investigation of the effect of a change in these 
parameters on discrimination. They also lead to the conclusion that within our setting, 
where the logit contest success function does not exhibit increasing returns to scale, 
an all-pay auction is always preferred to a logit contest success function from the 
point of view of the contest designer. This conclusion provides a new political-
economic micro foundation to some of the most commonly used models in the contest 
literature.  
 
2. Optimal contest design 
2.1 The setting 
In the basic one-stage contest setting, there are two risk-neutral contestants, the high 
and low benefit contestants, 1 and 2. The prize valuations of the contestants are 







= ≥ . Being chiefly 
concerned with the conditions under which the contest designer chooses an optimal 
contest, we assume that he has full knowledge of the contestants’ prize valuations. 
Given these valuations and the CSF,  ) , ( Pr 2 1 x x i , the function that specifies the 
contestants’ winning probability given their efforts  1 x  and  2 x , the expected net payoff 
of contestant i is: 
                          () i i i i x n x x u E − = ) , ( Pr 2 1 ,  (i=1,2)    (1) 
As in Epstein and Nitzan (2006b, 2007), let the objective function of the contest 
designer in our extended setting be a weighted average of the expected social welfare 
and lobbying efforts:   6
                              [ ] ( )( ) 2 1 2 1 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( x x u E u E G + − + + = ⋅ γ γ      (2) 
where the parameters γ  and () γ − 1  are the weights assigned to the expected social 
welfare and the contestants’ lobbying outlays. These weights represent the political 
culture; the culture reflected by the designer's genuine objectives or the culture that 
imposes this objective function on the designer. The designer is assumed to maximize 
the objective function (2) by setting the CSF, given the Nash equilibrium efforts of 
the contestants. His particular choice of the CSF together with the corresponding 
efforts of the contestants constitute the equilibrium of the extended contest.  
As in Epstein and Nitzan (2006b), the designer decides whether there is a 
contest on the prize or not. If there is no contest, he awards the prize to the individual 
with the higher prize valuation and no efforts are made by the potential contestants. 
Note that in contrast to the situation where the designer proposes a take-it-or-leave-it 
offer to the individual with the higher prize valuation, in our case, when there is no 
contest, the winner and not the designer enjoys the prize. If the designer prefers the 
existence of a contest, he has to ensure a genuine competitive environment that 
precludes the direct or indirect abolition of competition by exclusion of contestants
7, 
as explained in the introduction. We therefore focus on the widely studied contests 
with interior equilibria that are based on all-pay-auctions and on logit CSFs. 
 
2.2. All-pay auctions  
In our setting, certain winning means that the designer sets a CSF that leaves no 
residual winning uncertainty (RWU) after the revelation of the contestants' efforts. 
That is, the CSF for  0 > δ  is an all-pay auction given by:   















      if          0
      if       .5 0









     
 
and for  0 = δ ,  ( ) 1 , 2 1 1 = x x p , where the discrimination variable  0 ≥ δ  is selected by 
the contest designer. By (3), a reduction in δ  increases the bias in favor of the more 
motivated contestant 1. Furthermore,  1 0 < ≤ δ  implies a bias in favor of contestant 1, 
with an extreme bias when  0 = δ  (contestant 1 is the certain winner - the prize is 
                                                  
7 For example, by applying a CSF that is always unresponsive to their effort, as in Nti (2004).    7
awarded to the individual with the higher prize valuation). When  1 = δ  the contest is 
fair, there is no bias. When  1 > δ  the bias is in favor of contestant 2. 
The contest designer maximizes his objective function (2) by setting δ , given 
the contest success function which is of the form given by (3) and the Nash 
equilibrium efforts of the contestants. 
 
2.3. The logit lotteries  
The widely studied contest success function of the logit form for  0 > δ  is:  









= .         ( 4 )  
and for  0 = δ ,  ( ) 1 , 2 1 1 = x x p , where again  0 ≥ δ  is selected by the contest designer. In 
this case, α  can be viewed as the effect of a real unit of investment on the winning 
probability of a contestant. We make the standard assumption that the marginal effect 
of effort on the winning probability is fixed or declining. That is,  1 0 ≤ < α . While α  
is a given parameter, the designer, again, controls the institutional bias δ  when 
maximizing his objective function specified in (2). Our assumption that  1 0 ≤ < α  is 
warranted since, for any  1 ≥ k  and  0 > δ  (when  0 = δ  there is no competition), the 
second order conditions of the designer's problem are only satisfied when  1 0 ≤ < α  
(see proof of proposition 2 in the Appendix). The interpretations of the values that δ  
can take are the same as in sub-section 2.2. 
Whether a contest is held or not, crucially depends on the parameters k 
,α andγ  as pointed out in Epstein and Nitzan (2006 b). In particular, no contest is 
held and the prize is awarded to the contestant with the higher prize valuation, when 
5 . 0 > γ . Whenever a contest is held, our concern is focused on how the exogenous 
parameters k and γ  determine the optimal bias in favor of one of the contestants.
8 In 
particular, who is that contestant and how is the bias affected by changes in these 
parameters. The answer to these questions is not transparent because a change in k 




                                                  
8 Note that in Epstein and Nitzan (2006b) discrimination is not a control variable of the designer.   8
3. Optimal discrimination 
The contest designer controls the  institutional bias or the extent of the desired 
discrimination  0 ≥ δ . The first preliminary result specifies the optimal discrimination 
* δ  chosen by the designer under the all-pay auction; the first type of CSF on which 
we focus. 
 
Proposition 1: Under the all-pay-auction, the optimal value of discrimination is equal 
to  k =








 , and  0
* = δ , otherwise.  
 
Under an all-pay-auction, the contest is deterministic. In turn, the behavior of the 
contest designer is binary: for low values of γ ,  k =
* δ , which means that the designer 
is (incompletely) in favor of contestant 2. For high values of γ ,  0
* = δ , which means 
that the designer is (completely) in favor of contestant 1. This result can be explained 
in the following way. For low values of γ , the designer wishes to extract the maximal 
efforts from the contestants. Setting the optimal bias  k =
* δ  accomplishes the 
designer's attempt to maximize the extent of competition between the contestants. In 
fact, such bias eliminates the advantage of contestant 1 and creates actual equality 
between the competitors. While this bias completely eliminates the contestants' 
surplus (the utility of each contestant is zero), it maximizes their efforts and since γ  is 
low, it maximizes the designer's utility. For high values of γ , the designer wishes to 
maximize the total utilities of the contestants. He does so by setting the optimal bias 
0
* = δ , which means that contestant 1 gets the prize and no efforts are made by the 
contestants, so the designer's maximum utility is  1 n γ . 
The second result specifies the optimal discrimination under the logit CSF. 
 
Proposition 2: Under the logit contest success function, the optimal value of 
discrimination which depends on the parameters ( ) α γ, , k ,
 
is equal to 










, if  0 γ γ <  and  0
* = δ , otherwise, where 
() ( )k k γ αγ γ α 2 2 1 − − + + = Ω  and  0 γ  solves the equation  0 = Ω . 
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By Proposition 2, under the logit CSF there is no discrimination, 
* 1 δ = , for some 
intermediate political culture  e γ , where  e γ  satisfies 
* 1 δ = .
9 As expected, when γ  is 
smaller than  e γ , the equilibrium bias is in favor of contestant 2 with the lower prize 
valuation, 
α δ k ≤ <
* 1 . In such a case the bias is incomplete. Setting such a bias is 
warranted because the designer assigns a sufficiently large weight to the contestants' 
efforts and so he increases competition and, in turn, these efforts. Note that the 
maximal bias in favor of contestant 2, 
α δ k =
* , is obtained for  0 = γ . This implies 
that for any level of discrimination, the winning probability of contestant 1 is not 
smaller than 0.5 (it is equal to 0.5 in the extreme case where  0 = γ ). This is because 
the designer's utility is more strongly affected by the performance of contestant 1: his 
effort and his expected utility. Hence, for any type of designer the winning probability 
of contestant 1, which is affected by the bias, is not smaller than that of contestant 2.  
When  γ  is larger than e γ , the equilibrium bias is in favor of the more motivated 
contestant 1. Setting such a bias is warranted because the designer assigns a 
sufficiently large weight to the contestants' expected utility and so he reduces 
competition, which, in turn, increases the expected welfare of the contestants. Notice 
that  0 γ γ < e
10. Therefore, when  0 e γ γγ >>, that is, the political culture assigns a 
sufficiently high weight to the contestants' expected utility, thus inducing an interior 
equilibrium, the optimal bias in favor of contestant 1 is intermediate,  1 0
* < < δ . 
However, when  e γ γ γ > ≥ 0 , the bias in favor of contestant 1 is complete,  0
* = δ . To 
sum up, 
 
Corollary 1: Under the logit CSF,  
When  e γ γ = , 
* 1 δ = . 
When  e γ γ < , 
α δ k ≤ <
* 1 . The bias in favor of contestant 2 is maximal, 
α δ k =
* , for 
0 = γ .   
When  e γ γ > , 
* 01 δ ≤< . The bias in favor of contestant 1 is maximal,  0
* = δ , for 
e γ γ γ > ≥ 0 . 
                                                  




























γ e ,  3
1 ) 1 ( = = = α γ γ e e Max . 
10 For this result see Appendix B.   10
 
By Proposition 1, under the all-pay-auction, the optimal bias can have only two 
values;  k =
* δ  or  0
* = δ . The bias in favor of the less motivated contestant 2 is 
always larger than or equal to this bias under the logit CSF. Notice that for a 
sufficiently large γ , the bias under the two types of CSFs is equal,  0
* = δ , but the 
complete bias in favor of contestant 1 under the all-pay-auction requires the 
assignment of a larger weight of the contestants' expected utility,  1 0 γ γ ≤ . 
 
4. Discrimination and changes in political culture 
Utilizing the first two propositions, we now proceed to examine how changes in the 
political culture (γ ) affect the equilibrium bias 
* δ  . 
 
Proposition 3: In an interior equilibrium of the extended contest 
11, if the CSF is of 






δ . In an interior and exterior equilibrium of the extended 
contest, if the CSF is an all-pay-auction, then with the exception of a neighborhood of 







Let us explain the economic intuition behind this Proposition using the formal 
findings of the Appendix. An increase in γ  means that the designer assigns larger 
significance to the public well being relative to the total efforts made by the 
contestants. Under the logit CSF, in equilibrium, such an increase results in more 







Consequently, aggregate efforts fall because of their reduced weight in the objective 
function of the designer. 
  Notice that a bias in favor of the contestant with the higher valuation of the 
prize is not necessarily a bias in favor of the richer or stronger contestant. In 
particular, if the prize is monetary and the contestants' values represent their utilities 
from the prize, then since the marginal utility of income is declining, the contestant 
                                                  
11 Since  1 ≤ α , when there is an interior equilibrium under the logit CSF,  0 γ γ < , and so there also 
exists an interior equilibrium under the all-pay-auction because  1 γ γ < . Since  1 0 γ γ < , the former 
inequality is therefore a sufficient condition for an interior equilibrium in both cases.   11
with the higher valuation is the poorer one. In contrast, if the prize is not monetary, 
and it takes, for example, the form of the designer's commitment to improve the 
quality of the environment of one of the contestants, then it might be the case that the 
contestant with the higher prize valuation is the richer one (assuming that a rich 
individual values environmental quality more than a poor individual). In light of these 
two examples, if the CSF is of the logit form, Proposition 3 has two alternative 
interpretations. If the higher prize valuation is due to lower income (the first example 
above), then the increase in γ  intensifies affirmative action (
* δ  is reduced). If, 
however, the higher prize valuation characterizes the "stronger" (wealthier, 
privileged) contestant (the second example above), the increase in γ  can be viewed as 
weakening affirmative action in our contest setting. 
  Under an all-pay-auction, if γ  is sufficiently small,  1 γ γ < , the designer 
assigns more significance to the total efforts of the contestants. Again, in this case the 
optimal bias  k =
* δ  accomplishes the designer's attempt to maximize the extent of 
competition between the contestants. In fact, such bias eliminates the advantage of 
contestant 1, creates actual equality between the competitors and completely 
eliminates their surplus. Therefore the utility of each contestants is zero and the 
corresponding value of the designer's objective function, whose utility depends only 
on the expected aggregate efforts of the contestants in the mixed-strategy equilibrium 
of the contest, is  () ( ) 2 1
* 1 5 . 0 n n GA + − = γ . Thus, in equilibrium, the utility of the 
designer is equal to the average prize valuation times the weight assigned to the 
expected efforts. In contrast to the case of the logit CSF, under an all-pay-auction the 
contest is deterministic, and, in turn, the behavior of the designer is binary: for low 
values of γ ,  k =
* δ . For high values of γ ,  0
* = δ . Consequently, when γ  increases, 
and the equilibrium strategy of the designer is interior, his optimal discrimination 
remains  k =
* δ . This is due to the fact that the aggregate expected utility of the 
contestants remains zero and the weight assigned to total efforts, which also remain 
unchanged, is reduced. Note that when γ  increases, the designer can change his 
strategy from  k =
* δ  to  0
* = δ . In such a case contestant 1 wins the prize without 
making any effort and the designer's utility becomes  1
* n GL γ = . This utility is still 
lower than the reduced utility that is equal to (1 γ − ) multiplied by the equilibrium 
aggregate efforts corresponding to  k =
* δ  because γ  is small. That is, despite the   12
reduction in his utility, when γ  increases, the designer prefers this reduced utility to 
the still lower utility obtained for  0
* = δ . 
 
5. Discrimination and changes in prize valuations 
Let us examine how changes in the asymmetry in prize valuations (k) affect the 
equilibrium bias 
* δ  and the utility of the contest designer.  
 
Proposition 4:   
1.  In an interior equilibrium of the extended contest under the logit CSF, an 
increase in k has an equivocal effect on the equilibrium discrimination 
* δ . 






























. In particular,  1









2.  In an interior equilibrium of the extended contest under an all-pay-auction, if 
1 γ γ <  (see Proposition 1), then an increase in k results in an increase in the 

















γ , an increase in k increases the bias in favor 







. The reason for this is the 
designer's desire to make the competition more aggressive because of the large weight 
assigned to the contestants' efforts. Notice that the increase in the bias favoring the 
contestant with the lower prize valuation is relative to the situation where the bias δ  

















and increases expected utility of the contestant with the lower prize valuation, 
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. However, the aggregate expected utility of the contestants declines, 
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.
13 Relative to the (inferior) situation where δ  remains 
unchanged, the designer's utility is larger because the positive effect of the increased 
efforts due to the increased bias in favor of the contestant with the lower prize 
valuation dominates the negative effect of the reduced aggregate expected utility of 
the contestants. Note that the last claim does not imply that the designer's utility 
always increases. In particular, when  2 n  is reduced, and the designer responds 







GL ; nevertheless, it is still larger 
relatively to his utility in the situation where  2 n  declines, yet δ  remains unchanged. 





, an increase in k, the asymmetry between the 








. The reason for this is the designer's attempt to make the 
competition less aggressive because of the large weight assigned to the contestants' 
expected utility.  
  As explained in the discussion following Corollary 1, under an all-pay-
auction, the nature of the contest is binary and therefore when k increases and the 
equilibrium is interior,  1 γ γ < , the designer becomes more biased in favor of the 







, in order to equalize the 
contestants' chances of winning, and thus induce them to increase their efforts 
relatively to the case where the bias remains unchanged (equal to its value before the 

























, which means that the 
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13  For these results see Appendix B.   14
to the situation where δ  is not changed, the net effect on the designer's utility is 
positive because the increase in utility due to the increased efforts of the contestants 
dominates the reduced expected utility of the contestant with the higher prize 
valuation. The increased bias in favor of contestant 2 increases the designer's utility 
relative to the situation where he leaves the bias intact in response to the increase in k. 
Again, note that this claim does not imply that the designer's utility necessarily 
increases. In particular, when  2 n  declines and the designer responds optimally by 








GA ; nevertheless, it is still larger 
relative to his utility in the situation where  2 n  declines, yet δ  remains unchanged. 
Also note that a change in a contestant's prize valuation positively affects the utility of 
the contest designer, provided that the political culture (the value of the parameter γ ) 
is associated with an interior equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 4': In an interior equilibrium, an increase in  i n , i=(1,2) increases the 
utility of the contest designer. 
 
6. The superiority of the all-pay-auction 
In the literature, the CSF is usually assumed to be of the logit or all-pay-auction type. 
By Propositions 1 and 2, we get that an all-pay-auction is always the superior CSF.  
 
Proposition 5: For any  γ , the contest designer's utility under the all-pay-auction is 
larger than or equal to his utility under the logit CSF. 
 
This final result provides a new political-economic micro foundation to some of the 
most commonly used models in the contest literature. It supports the common 
assumption that the CSF is an all-pay-auction because this CSF emerges as an 
equilibrium strategy in the extended game where the contest designer chooses 
between these two types of CSFs as well as determines the nature of the contest, that 
is, the bias in favor of one of the contestants. The contrast between Proposition 5 and 
Proposition 2 in Fang (2002) is due to his different model where no discrimination 
(exogenous or endogenous) is allowed and  1 = α . The contrast between Proposition 5 
and Proposition 3 in Che and Gale (1997), where the lottery contest may generate   15
higher expected effort if the asymmetry is large, is caused by several differences in 
their modeling. Although they do not allow (exogenous or endogenous) 
discrimination or asymmetry in the contestants' prize valuations, they assume that the 
contestants have budget constraints. This implies that there is asymmetry between the 
differences between a contestant's prize valuation and the wealth of the second to the 
richest contestant which is critical in determining equilibrium under the all-pay-
auction.   
 
7. Conclusion 
This study contributes new insights to the political economy of discrimination in 
contests. It demonstrates that political culture and asymmetry in the contested prize 
valuations are useful explanatory factors for understanding the diversity in the extent 
of discrimination in different societies. As we have seen, in the real complex contest 
environments, discrimination is often controlled by contest designers. The objective 
of our contest designer reflects his political culture and one could empirically test for 
our hypotheses on the nature of discrimination in contests by considering different 
types of contests carried out over different periods of time by different political 
parties or different government officials in power. By doing so one could expose, in 
particular, the political culture that inspires the existing bias in the existing contests 
(whether the discrimination is in favor of the contestant with the low or high prize 
valuation).  
 Focusing  on  the two most widely studied types of contest success functions 
(CSFs), deterministic all-pay-auctions and logit CSFs, we specify in Propositions 1 
and 2 the relationship between discrimination in contests and the prevailing political 
culture (the weights assigned to the expected aggregate utility of the contestants and 
to their total efforts) as well as the asymmetry in the contestants' prize valuations. 
Under the logit CSF, we then derive in Corollary 1 the conditions that determine 
whether the optimal bias is in favor of the contestant with the larger or smaller prize 
valuation. It turns out that bias in favor of the more motivated contestant is driven by 
the assignment of sufficiently large weight to the expected utility of the contestants. In 
such a case, the contest designer wishes to increase the winning probability of the 
contestant with the larger prize valuation. Such an increase is sufficient to positively 
affect the total expected utility of the contestants. Bias in favor of the contestant with 
the lower motivation is due to the assignment of sufficiently large weight to the   16
contestants' efforts. In such a case, the contest designer wishes to equalize the 
"strength" of the contestants and increase the extent of competition in order to induce 
the contestants to make larger efforts. We proceed by establishing in Proposition 3 
that under a logit CSF, the bias in favor of the contestant with the higher prize 
valuation is increasing in the weight assigned to the expected utility of the contestants. 
Under an all-pay-auction, since the equilibrium bias can take only two values (k or 0), 
the bias in favor of the more motivated contestant is almost always invariant to a 
change in the weight assigned to the contestants' expected utility. The effect of 
valuation asymmetry on the optimal bias is ambiguous. By Proposition 4, the bias in 
favor of the more motivated contestant is decreasing (non-decreasing) in valuation 
asymmetry provided that the weight assigned to the expected utility of the contestants 
is sufficiently small (large). By the last result, Proposition 5, an all-pay auction is 
always preferred to a logit CSF from the point of view of the contest designer, 
provided that the logit CSF is of decreasing or constant returns to scale. This finding 
provides a new political-economic micro rationalization to some of the most 
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Appendix A 
Proof Proposition 1: When  0 2 1 ≥ − n n δ , in a mixed-strategy equilibrium, under any 









  and 







n GA .  Since the inequality ( ) 0 1 3 1 > − + − γ γ k  is 








, we get the following result: 
1. If  1 γ γ < , then the optimal discrimination is the maximal δ  consistent with the 
constraint  0 2 1 ≥ − n n δ , which is  k n n = = 2 1
* / δ . This is an interior equilibrium of 
the extended all-pay-auction. 
2. If  1 γ γ ≥ , then the optimal discrimination is  0
* = δ , that is the prize is awarded to 
the contestant with the higher prize valuation without a contest.               Q.E.D 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: In equilibrium  
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The second order conditions of equilibrium require that  ( ) 2 , 1 , 0 /
2 2 = < ∂ ∂ i x u E i i  and 
the contestants' payoffs must be non-negative, that is,  ( ) 0
* ≥ i u E  which requires  
0 ) 1 ( ≥ − + δ α
α k  and  0 ) 1 ( ≥ − +
α α δ k . 
A sufficient condition for the above four conditions to be satisfied is that  1 ≤ α . The 
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n GL  
Suppose that the equilibrium discrimination level set by the contest designer is 
interior, that is,  0
* > δ  (later on we examine the possibility of  0
* = δ ). In such a case   20





. This implies that the optimal bias 
chosen by the designer is equal to: 
(9)   () ( ) []
() ( ) () Ω + −
Ω
=
− + + + −
− + + + −
=
1 2 2 1 2





γ αγ γ α γ




The second order condition for this interior equilibrium is; 













αγ γ α γ
δ α k
k GL  which is satisfied if: 
(10)   ( )( ) 0 2 1 2 > − + + + − αγ γ α γ k  
Hence, the existence of an interior equilibrium bias,  0
* > δ , requires that the 
nominator in (9) is also positive. That is, 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 > − + + − + = − + + + − = Ω α α γ α αγ γ α γ k k k k  
Since  1 > k , we get that  () 0 1 2 2 1 > − + + α α k , which implies that the nominator in 
(9) is positive if:   




















This inequality requires that  5 . 0 < γ . If condition (11) is not satisfied () 1 0 ≤ ≤γ γ , 
then  0
* = δ , which means that contestant 1 is awarded the prize without any contest. 
In such a case  1
* n GL γ = . Since  1 > k , inequality (11) implies that the SOC is satisfied. 
An interior equilibrium therefore exists if and only if: 





















                              Q.E.D 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: Under the logit CSF, in an interior equilibrium,  
( )( )




















Assuming that the equilibrium is interior, we substitute 
* δ in (8) to obtain: 
(13)      () ( ) [ ] { }
() ( ) γ α
γ γ γ α
2 1 1 4
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δ , let us examine the effect of γ  in 
an interior equilibrium on the efforts of the contestants, their winning probability and 
their expected utility. Substituting 
* δ (see (9)) in (5) – (7) we get:  
(14)     ()
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Remark: From (13) and (14) one could erroneously deduce that when γ  converges to 
0.5, 
*
L G  and 
*
i x converge, respectively, to infinity and minus infinity. Let us show that,   22
in fact, in an interior equilibrium  1
* 5 . 0 n GL <  and  i i n x α 25 . 0 0
* < < . The reason for this 
is that one has to take into account that in an interior equilibrium inequality (12) is 
satisfied. More specifically, since for any combination of the parameters, in an 




























































































































converges to zero. If α  is given,  1 0 ≤ < α , the expression converges to zero provided 
that  k converges to 1. This means that for high values of k  the condition is not 
satisfied. Hence, γ  will converge to 0.5 and there will exist an interior equilibrium 
only when k is sufficiently small (approaching 1). One cannot ask therefore what 
happens to 
*
L G  when γ  converges to 0.5, without taking into account that in such a 
case the permissible combinations of k and α  are reduced. As to 
*
i x , by inequality 
(12) the expression within the parenthesis { } in (14) is positive and, therefore, 
i i n x α 25 . 0 0
* < < . For the same reason, the winning probabilities in (17) and (18) are 
between 0 and 1. 
When the CSF is an all-pay-auction, using the proof of Proposition 1 we get 
the following result: 





1 * δ . In this case, 
() ( ) 2 1






δ  and  () 0 5 . 0 2 1
*







2. If  1 γ γ ≥ , then the optimal discrimination is  0
* = δ . In this case,  1















                                                                     
Q.E.D.   23
 
 Proof of Proposition 4: Let us examine the effect of a change in k,  1 n  and  2 n  on 
* δ  
at an interior equilibrium under the logit CSF: 
( ) [ ]( ) ( ) { }
() ( ) []
2
2 2 2 2 1 *
2 1 2
3 1 4 1 2 1
αγ γ α γ
γ γ γ γ α α δ
α
− + + + −





























. To prove the validity of this claim, notice that 
1 > k  implies that ()k k 4 1
2 > + . Therefore, if  ( )
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The last expression is positive, provided that  ( ) γ γ α > −2 1
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. To prove the validity of this claim, notice that 
1 > k  implies that ( ) k k 4 1
2 > + . Therefore, if  ( )






, then:  
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The last expression is negative when  ( ) γ γ α < −2 1








γ . Since 





















. In particular, this 
implies that for  γ < 3













Max  and, therefore, if 
γ < 3
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Let us examine now the effect of a change in  1 n  on  1 x  . 
() ( )
() ( ) () () () [] k k k k k
k n
x
4 1 1 1 2 1 1
1 2 1
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γ . Let us prove 
















, as proved above. Since  1 ≤ α ,  ( ) 1 5 3 1 3 3
2 3 2 2 3 + − + > + + + k k k k k k α , 
which is equivalent to the following inequalities: 
 
() ( )()( ) [] 1 4 1 1 1
2 2 3 − + − − > + k k k k k α ;  ( ) ( ) ( )() [ ] 1 4 1 1 1
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Let us proceed with the examination of the effect of a change in  2 n  on  2 x . Notice that 
inequality (12) is equivalent to the inequality: 
() ( ) () γ γ α 1 2 1 1 − > − + k k  ⇔   ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 γ γ α − > − + k k  
Since  () 0 1 4
2 > − k kγ , we get that 
() ( )
() () ( ) () [ ] () {} 0 1 4 1 2 1 1 1
1 2 1
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Consider next the effect of a change in  j n on 
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k , we get that 
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By these results one can see that the effect of a change in  2 n  on total efforts is 











, but the effect of a change in  1 n  is ambiguous. 
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Hence,  () ( ) ( )( ) 3 1 2 1 1
2 2 2 2 + − > − + k k k γ γ α ⇔ () () []
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, as shown 
above. Since  1 ≤ α
 
,  ( ) 1 2 3 2
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. Consider now the effect of changes in  1 n  and  2 n  
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Both of these two last terms are positive, because due to the second order conditions, 
() ( ) [] 0 2 2 1 1 > − + − + γ γ γ α k  and in an interior equilibrium, 
() ( ) [] 0 2 2 1 1 > − + − + k k γ γ γ α .                                                                              Q.E.D 
 
Proof of Proposition 5:  


















γ , (the necessary condition for an interior equilibrium 

















































γ , then  k =
* δ  and  ( )( ) 1 1 5 . 0 2
* + − = k n GA γ  . Let us 
prove that in this case, we always obtain that 
* *
A L G G < : 
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 (which exceeds γ , because we consider interior equilibria under the 



































γ  which means that 
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, then under the logit CSF  0
* = δ  in 
which case  1
* n GL γ =  and under the all-pay-auction  k =
* δ  and 

















γ  is equivalent to 
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γ , then under the two CSFs  0
* = δ  and in both cases we get 
that  1
* * n G G L A γ = = .                     Q.E.D 
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. By (9), when 
0 > γ , in an interior equilibrium, 
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